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There is considerable evidence to suggest that in the period 2002-2012 at 
least, Iran was engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging. From 2013 
onwards, however, the picture is less clear. A series of developments - the 
agreement of the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the election of President 
Rouhani, and the subsequent comprehensive nuclear deal, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – challenged thinking on Iranian 
proliferation behaviour and opened up two potential scenarios.  
 
On the one hand, Iran may have abandoned hedging and committed to the 
pursuit of fully reintegrating into the international community. On the other, 
Iran’s success in negotiating partial, but not complete, rollback may represent 
a more mature phase of hedging. Tehran may have decided that efforts to 
advance its nuclear latency have reached their limit for now. From this 
perspective, Iran has retained a low level of latency that, crucially, includes an 
enrichment capacity. Furthermore, many of the provisions contained in the 
JCPOA will expire in a decade and Iran will then be free to resume much of its 
activities.  
 
Against this background, this project had two objectives: to generate insights 
into Saudi Arabia’s nuclear intentions and how these have been influenced by 
an Iran widely perceived to be engaged in a strategy based on nuclear 
hedging; and to explore the measures that Western powers might adopt to 
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s commitment to nuclear restraint. 
 
Our research indicates that thinking in Riyadh, and indeed across the Gulf 
Arab states more broadly, favors the second scenario: that Iran continues to 
hedge its bets in the nuclear arena. This perspective has framed the regional 
response and the nuclear-oriented response to Iran’s proliferation behaviour 
has taken place at two levels. 
 
Collectively, Arab states have used collaborative fora (GCC and Arab League) 
to announce plans to develop nuclear technology and infrastructures across 
the region. Individually, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its efforts to develop a 
nuclear infrastructure and there are indications that Riyadh intends to offset 
any Iranian advantage with its own nuclear capacity. 
 
In terms of encouraging continued nuclear restraint in the region, our study 
has three main conclusions. First, while the JCPOA leaves Iran with an 
enrichment capability and a low level of nuclear latency, the trade-off here 
came in the form of greater transparency and increased oversight regarding 
Iran’s nuclear activities over a prolonged period. Iran has thus far met its 
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obligations under the JCPOA. Further progress in this vein will, over time, 
have a cumulative effect in terms of evidencing Iran’s claims that it is 
committed to addressing concerns regarding its nuclear objectives. Second, it 
is of central importance that regional actors are eventually engaged in 
dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue. Areas here could include nuclear 
safety and nuclear security, both issues with implications that reach beyond 
regional rivalries. Our research suggests that experts in the GCC countries 
are not opposed to dialogue with Iran on nuclear safety and security, although 
they are generally wary of any dialogue with Tehran. For its part, Iran could 
build on the current dialogue that it has with the European Union on nuclear 
safety to include the Arab Gulf states as a confidence building measure. 
 
Third, security assurances likely have an important role to play in providing an 
insurance policy of sorts to the GCC states, either collectively or on an 
individual basis. Specific positive security assurances have already been 
issued by all five nuclear weapon state parties of the NPT to provide or 
support assistance to all Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) parties if they 
fall victim to acts of aggression involving nuclear weapons. But as part of 
acclimatizing to, and reassuring the GCC states about, the prospect of Iran 
retaining a hedging option under the JCPOA, the UN Security Council’s five 
permanent members (P5) should continue to consider how they can enhance 
these assurances at the regional level. 
 
Positive security assurances can also come in the form of security 
guarantees. Traditionally, the GCC states relied heavily on bilateral security 
arrangements with the USA and other Western powers, including France and 
the UK, to come to their aid in the event of external aggression. While Iranian 
hedging is not an overt form of aggression, the anxiety caused by the latent 
threat of nuclear acquisition could perhaps be dealt with through enhanced 
security guarantees. From a GCC perspective, missile defense cooperation 
could potentially form the basis of a future deterrence-by-denial posture if Iran 
were to make a dash for the bomb. This is a less provocative option. It also 
allows the region to develop a deterrent posture without having to take risks 
related to the reliability, and therefore the credibility, of any nuclear promises 
that could potentially be offered by external powers. 
 
The non-proliferation implications of the Iranian nuclear challenge and the 
JCPOA are significant. Consequently, it is not surprising that the nuclear issue 
continues to focus attention. Yet our research suggests that the emphasis 
placed on the nuclear issue by Western powers is not reflected in the region 
and may be analytically limiting, as well as politically naive. Our research 
indicates that for many in the region, the nuclear issue is in fact secondary to 
broader concerns regarding what is perceived as Iran’s expansionist regional 
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policy under an opaque, convoluted Islamic government, and this is not new. 
More specifically, the dominant concern regarding the JCPOA is the extent to 
which the deal and the budding rapprochement with Western powers facilitate 
Tehran’s subversive maneuvering in the Middle East. 
 
The analysis underpinning the project brings together insights drawn from 
existing literature on proliferation behaviour and Middle Eastern Studies, as 
well as opinions and perspectives gathered via discussions with academics, 
analysts and members of the policy community in Europe, the United States 
and the Middle East. The project also draws on the ideas and views 
expressed at an expert workshop, held in the Middle East and focused on 
regional security in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal. The workshop was a 
closed event held under the Chatham House Rule. The research led to a 
number of academic publications, comment pieces and high-level policy 
briefings. This final project report seeks to summarize the core arguments and 





























Project Aims and Objectives  
 
For over a decade, considerable attention has been devoted to the potential 
regional impact of a nuclear-armed Iran.1 On a number of occasions, Saudi 
Arabia claimed that if Iran attempted to cross the nuclear threshold, Riyadh 
would follow suit. The debate between those who believe that Iran wants to 
acquire nuclear weapons and those who argue that Iran’s intentions are 
benign frame the analysis on regional security.2 
 
Prior to 2013, this debate was fuelled by the fact Iran had gone beyond what 
was strictly required for a civil nuclear program. The country was in non-
compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and was subject to several rounds of United Nations Security 
Council sanctions. Furthermore, the IAEA published a damning report in 
November 2011 that set out a detailed account of past nuclear weapons-
relevant activities undertaken by Iran. Certainly, Iran always maintained that 
its nuclear program was for purely peaceful purposes, but many were 
unconvinced. The intransigent and often belligerent approach of then 
President Ahmadinejad on the nuclear issue compounded these suspicions. 
 
From 2013 onwards, the situation changed dramatically. The rise to power of 
President Rouhani marked a move away from the contentious politics of the 
Ahmadinejad era. The new president immediately sought to engage with the 
international community on the nuclear issue. Granted, work to this effect had 
already begun behind the scenes – the United States and Iran met in secret 
back channel talks facilitated by the Sultan of Oman in March 2013 – yet 
President Rouhani heralded a pragmatic and moderate approach that would 
eventually result in a landmark nuclear deal. The JCPOA was signed in July 
2015 and set the path towards resolution of the Iranian nuclear challenge. 
 
Clearly, this seemingly straightforward narrative progression from crisis to 
resolution belies the complexity of the situation. Take the binary 
acquisition/restraint lens through which many commentators viewed Iran’s 
nuclear activities prior to the agreement of the interim Joint Plan of Action 
(JPOA) and election of President Rouhani in 2013. There is now much 
evidence to suggest that Iran was, for the period 2002-2012 at least (it was at 
this point that the US and Iran began secret bilateral talks on the nuclear 																																																								
1 See for example: Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (eds), Getting Ready for a Nuclear-
Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January 2005). 
2 For differing perspectives see Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian 
Nuclear Threat (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014); and Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran 
Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era”, Foreign Affairs (2014), Vol. 93, No. 
3, pp. 49-59. 
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issue), engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging rather than an 
outright pursuit of the bomb. Statements of senior policy officials in the United 
States, Israel and even Iran reflected this. In February 2011, for example, 
Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, noted the following in a 
written statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “We assess 
Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by 
developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such 
weapons, should it chose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will 
eventually decide to build nuclear weapons”.3 Based on our research on 
Iranian nuclear behavior over the past four years, it is our contention that for 
those of us looking from the outside in, a strategy of nuclear hedging is the 
only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence available in open-
sources. This view will be explained in more detail in the following section. 
 
If we remain convinced that Iranian proliferation behaviour from 2002-2013 
constituted a strategy based on nuclear hedging, our analysis of the period 
since then is far less certain. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to 
reduce its number of installed centrifuges by approximately two-thirds (from 
19,000 to just over 6,000) – a reduction of 68 per cent – and reduce its 
stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) from some 10,000 kg to 300 kg for 
15 years – a reduction of 97 per cent. Tehran also agreed to the most 
intrusive non-proliferation inspection regime ever devised. Clearly, the deal is 
not perfect – critics of the JCPOA have highlighted the limited duration of the 
deal as a crucial weakness – and it does allow Iran to retain sensitive 
enrichment capacity albeit in a limited fashion. Yet there can be no doubt that 
the deal rolled back Iran’s nuclear capacity and placed significant distance 
between Tehran and the bomb. 
 
What, then, does this mean for Iranian nuclear hedging? Has Iran abandoned 
this strategic approach? Or is this simply another phase of hedging? How will 
the JCPOA impact on the actions of key regional players? These are some of 
the questions raised by recent developments and the answers are by no 
means clear. 
 
Against this background, our project began by focusing on Saudi Arabia’s 
response to Iran’s behaviour and activities in the nuclear arena. How does 
Riyadh perceive Iran’s nuclear advancement over the past 15 years? How 
has the JCPOA impacted on thinking in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the 
region? How does Iranian nuclear latency affect the balance of power in the 																																																								
3 James R Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Statement for the Record 
on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select 




Middle East? The notion of a ‘latent arsenal’, that is to say the ability to 
develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly has its own deterrent effect, even 
if this is subject to interpretation. Can Saudi Arabia live with a nuclear-capable 
Iran? Or will the Kingdom seek to develop its own hedging capability? Saudi 
Prince Turki al-Faisal (former head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence 
Directorate) seemed to imply as much at a 2014 regional security conference: 
“preserving our regional security requires that we […] work to create a real 
balance of forces […] including a nuclear know-how, and to be ready for any 
possibility in relation to the Iranian nuclear file”.4 
 
In attempting to answer the questions above, the project also considered the 
measures that Western powers might adopt to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to nuclear restraint. What additional US security guarantees 
and/or armaments might be required to offset any Saudi Arabian nuclear 
aspirations? Washington is already the Kingdom’s principal supplier of 
advanced conventional weaponry and this relationship will undoubtedly play a 
key role in Riyadh’s nuclear calculations. What other incentives – economic, 
political, other – could contribute to strengthening Saudi Arabia’s commitment 
to nuclear restraint?  
 
As the research project gained momentum, however, we realized that the 
Western focus on the Iranian nuclear issue had limiting effects. Certainly, the 
prospect of Iranian proliferation represents a significant threat to international 
security. In this sense, we regard the JCPOA as an emphatic success for 
diplomacy. Yet regional governments viewed the nuclear deal and its 
significance differently, and Western focus on the nuclear issue 
overshadowed these views.  
 
In this context, the findings of our research were significant enough to force a 
rethink of our approach. Alongside our original objectives, we found it 
necessary to widen our analytical lens and look beyond the nuclear issue.	The 
core contribution of this project, then, constitutes an analysis of regional 
security and how key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia are likely to 
respond to the nuclear deal and Iran’s residual nuclear capacity. In addition, 
the project explores the relationship between the nuclear issue and broader 
regional security concerns. 
 
In the sections that follow, we will briefly explain the concept of nuclear 
hedging and why this holds such relevance to the Iranian case. We will then 
set out some of the key points emerging from our research on the impact of 																																																								




the JCPOA and how this shaped thinking in the region. Our research shows 
that regional actors view the nuclear issue as significant, but regard it as only 
one element of a broader and complex regional security equation that sees 
Iran seeking to increase its influence either directly or through proxies on a 
variety of fronts. In this context, the region views the JCPOA and the budding 
rapprochement between Iran and Western powers as an enabling factor for 
Iran's aspirations to regional hegemony. The report finishes by setting out the 




Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging 
 
Ariel Levite defines nuclear hedging as “a national strategy of maintaining, or 
at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to 
produce them within a relatively short time frame ranging from several weeks 
to a few years”.5 It is a strategy that lies “between nuclear pursuit and nuclear 
rollback”.6 For several years prior to the agreement of the JCPOA many high-
ranking policy officials expressed views that characterized Tehran’s nuclear 
strategy as one based on nuclear hedging, even if this precise term was not 
commonly used. These characterizations emanated from various countries, 
including the United States, Israel and even Iran.7 
 
In previous research on Iran the authors have identified three categories of 
indicators that, in combination, may suggest a country is engaged in nuclear 
hedging. The three categories of hedging indicators include: opaque 
proliferation and moves towards latency; the nuclear narrative; and 
international diplomacy. In terms of opaque proliferation and moves towards 
latency, there were a number of relevant factors to be considered in the 
Iranian context. These included the gap between Tehran’s stated civil 
rationale and the nuclear program’s maturity, a track record of concealment 
and covert development, and evidence of work relevant to weaponization. At 
the same time, there was evidence that Iran was cognizant of the red-lines of 
key actors such as Israel, particularly with regard to stockpiles of enriched 
uranium. 
 
The nuclear narrative relates to the manner in which political elites represent 
the nuclear program, and how these representations reflect and feed into 
broader themes of national identity, sovereignty and place in the international 
arena. In this context, Tehran constructed a powerful narrative of victimization 
that tapped into issues of nationalism and sovereign rights, and effectively 
converted international opposition into domestic political support for the 
regime. This narrative also held international appeal and resounded with 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Crucially, however, we found 
that the narrative placed important constraints on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. A 
powerful consensus emerged in the Iranian domestic political arena around 
civil nuclear advancement, but there was no such support for a military 
nuclear program. As such, evidence of a weapons program would leave the 																																																								
5 Ariel E. Levite, ‘Never say never again: nuclear reversal revisited’, International Security 
(2002), Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 69. 
6 Ibid., p. 59. 
7 Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, “Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran’s 
nuclear strategy”, International Affairs (2015), Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 687–707. 
 
 11	
regime open to attack. This point is significant since the Green Movement of 
2009 demonstrated the potential for politically charged issues to challenge the 
authorities. 
 
With regard to international diplomacy, and notwithstanding several missed 
opportunities on the part of Western powers, Iran’s diplomacy on the nuclear 
issue was frequently used as a means of dissipating international pressure 
and providing cover for the nuclear program to advance. Iran also cultivated 
relations with China and Russia in an effort to offset pressure from the West. 
 
The above paragraphs give a flavor of our exploration of Iranian nuclear 
hedging. This work is developed more fully in a number of separate 
publications where we argue in great detail that ‘hedging’ most aptly describes 
Iran’s nuclear behavior in the period 2002-2013. Crucially, however, the 
changes that took place from 2013 onwards introduced an element of 
uncertainty into the picture and the application of our hedging indicators 
ceased to be so straightforward. The rise to power of President Rouhani 
resulted in significant changes to the nuclear narrative. Rouhani moved away 
from the belligerent rhetoric of the Ahmadinejad era and adopted a more 
moderate and conciliatory position. This was reflected in the diplomatic 
sphere where negotiators began to make real progress towards a 
comprehensive agreement. From a technical perspective, the resultant 
JCPOA saw Iran agree to significantly roll back its nuclear capacity. 
 
In the context of Iranian proliferation behaviour these developments opened 
the possibility of two potential scenarios. On the one hand, Iran may have 
abandoned hedging and committed to the pursuit of fully reintegrating into the 
international community. On the other, Iran’s success in negotiating partial, 
but not complete, rollback may represent a more mature phase of hedging. 
Tehran may have decided that efforts to advance its nuclear latency have 
reached their limit for now. From this perspective, Iran has retained a low level 
of latency that, crucially, includes an enrichment capacity. Furthermore, many 
of the provisions contained in the JCPOA will expire in a decade and Iran will 
then be free to resume much of its activities. From our perspective, there is 
simply not enough evidence to provide a robust base to support either of 
these scenarios. It is this very uncertainty that led to a further entrenchment of 
views on Iran and its behavior among the Arab Gulf states.   
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Non-Proliferation Implications of the Iranian Nuclear Deal 
 
How then, have key actors in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, 
responded to Iran’s proliferation behaviour? What are the non-proliferation 
implications of the JCPOA in the region? In an article in International Affairs, 
we drew on research conducted as part of this project as we sought to 
address these questions and consider the non-proliferation implications of a 
successful JCPOA.8 Much of the following analysis is drawn from this article. 
 
In the section above, we noted that there are two potential scenarios that 
emerged from the JCPOA. Simply put, one views Iran’s nuclear rollback as 
evidence of Tehran’s decision to abandon hedging as a strategic approach, 
while the other views recent developments as simply another phase in Iran’s 
hedging strategy. Having advanced as far as possible, Iran has decided to roll 
back and consolidate its position. The retention of an enrichment capability 
carries significant weight with regard to this perspective. Crucially, of these 
two scenarios, our research shows that it is the latter one that frames the 
thinking of Arab Gulf states and this, in turn, conditions the response in the 
region. 
 
Against this background, the nuclear-oriented response to Iran’s proliferation 
behaviour has taken place at two levels. Collectively, Arab states have used 
collaborative fora to announce plans to develop nuclear technology and 
infrastructures across the region. As early as December 2006, for example, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced that the organization would 
study the establishment of “a joint program of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes, according to general standards and arrangements”. 9  These 
announcements could be interpreted as an expression of the Arab States’ 
desire to develop their own nuclear capacity, which would potentially serve as 
the basis for rival hedging options. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the 
GCC summit communiqué announcing the study also called on Iran to 
cooperate with the international community to resolve outstanding issues 
related to its nuclear activities, thereby suggesting a correlation between GCC 
plans and Tehran’s nuclear activities.10  
 
This theme of collective nuclear development continued when, in March 2007, 
the	 Arab League’s Council of Foreign Ministers instructed the Arab Atomic 
Energy Authority to work up plans “for an Arab strategy to acquire the 
																																																								
8 Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, “Living with nuclear hedging: The implications of Iran’s 
nuclear strategy”, International Affairs (2015), Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 687-707. 
9 Roula Khalaf, “Arab Gulfs weigh joint nuclear program”, Financial Times, 10 December 
2006. 
10 “Summit ends with call for N-capability”, Times of Oman, 11 December 2006. 
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necessary scientific know-how and technologies to develop nuclear power for 
peaceful purpose by the year 2020”.11  
 
Despite these high-level statements, a coherent pan-Arab nuclear strategy did 
not emerge. There has been movement at the second level of the nuclear-
oriented response to Iran’s nuclear program, namely the response of 
individual states in the region. States such as UAE and Saudi Arabia have 
invested resources and taken steps forward in their budding nuclear 
programs. Of these, UAE is the most advanced, having made progress on the 
first reactor in its USD 20 billion program, yet it also poses the least risk in 
proliferation terms. UAE signed a bilateral 123 Agreement with the United 
States that places considerable restraints on the scope of the country’s 
nuclear advancement, including fully abandoning domestic uranium 
enrichment. 12  The UAE has sought to position itself as a model of 
transparency and non-proliferation in the region. Little appears to have 
changed with the advent of the JCPOA, although our research suggests that 
some have begun to question the soundness of the 123 Agreement but this 
has not led to any change in the leadership’s commitment to a fully 
transparent nuclear program.13 The scope and speed of the UAE program’s 
remains the same, suggesting that in the medium term at least, the country is 
not seeking to rival Iran’s nuclear capacity. 
 
A less advanced, but arguably more interesting case is that of Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi concerns over Iran have steadily increased since the first public 
revelations of Iran’s clandestine activities emerged in late summer 2002. 
Riyadh initiated a strategic review in 2003 in response to developments in 
Iran.14 This review was never made public but leaked elements of its content 
indicate analysis of how Riyadh might respond to a nuclear Iran. Options 
include acquiring nuclear weapons for deterrence; maintaining or entering a 
new alliance with an existing nuclear weapon state; and seeking an 
agreement for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.15 
 
The option of relying purely on the realization of a nuclear-free Middle East is 
clearly not a credible one for Riyadh at present, given recent Saudi 
statements. Moreover, efforts to hold a Middle East Weapons of Mass 																																																								
11 “Saudi paper says Iran nuclear issue casts shadow on Arab summit”, Al Jazirah [sic], 15 
March 2007, accessed via BBC Monitoring.  
12 UAE Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement), Press release, 21 
May 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123747.htm 
13 Project interviews, April 2016. In April and May 2016, interviews were conducted with GCC 
officials from Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. To protect the 
anonymity of sources, individual comments are not directly attributed. 	




destruction (WMD) Free Zone conference have faltered since the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference.16 Of the other two options, the frequently mentioned 
provision of a nuclear weapons capability by Pakistan – allegedly in return for 
Riyadh’s financial support for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program – holds 
little credibility. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have officially denied 
speculation to this effect and it seems unlikely that Islamabad would want to 
risk the political opprobrium that would undoubtedly accompany such a move, 
particularly as a non-state party to the NPT constantly forced to defend its 
position as a responsible nuclear power. 
 
The alternative prospect of Pakistani-controlled weapons being positioned on 
Saudi soil in a type of extended deterrence scenario carries slightly more 
credibility, but only in the extreme event of Iran declaring itself an overt 
nuclear power - which, given the early success of the JCPOA, does not 
appear to be viable prospect in the medium term. 
 
What, then, of Saudi Arabia developing an indigenous nuclear capacity? From 
the outset of the Iranian nuclear challenge, Riyadh was clear that the 
Kingdom was vehemently opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and 
would respond in kind if this came to pass. In 2009, for example, King 
Abdullah made clear to then visiting US special envoy to the Middle East, 
Dennis Ross, that the Kingdom ‘will get nuclear weapons’ if Iran does.17  
 
Evidently, the nature of the threat from Iran’s nuclear program changed with 
the implementation of the JCPOA, but Saudi Arabia’s desire to counter any 
perceived Iranian advantage in the region did not fade. In February 2014, for 
example, former Saudi chief of intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal said that if 
Iran was allowed to retain enrichment capability in a deal, “I think we should 
insist on having equal rights for everybody, this is part of the [Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty] arrangement”.18 More recent comments followed a similar 
line: “whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same” and “if Iran 
has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia 
that’s going to ask for that [...] The whole world will be an open door to go that 
route without any inhibition”.19 
 
																																																								
16 Kelsey Davenport, “Slow progress on Middle East zone decried”, Arms Control Today, April 
2015.	
17 Mark Urban, “Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from Pakistan”, BBC News, 6 November 
2013. 
18“Saudi Arabia wants uranium enrichment capacity”, Nuclear Threat Initiative,14 February 
2014, http://www.nti.51org/gsn/article/saudi-arabia-reportedly-wants-develop-full-nuclear-fuel-
cycle/ 
19 Barbara Plett Usher, “Iran deal could start nuclear fuel race – Saudi Arabia”, BBC News 16 
March 2015. 
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Certainly, Saudi Arabia has ambitious plans for nuclear expansion. It 
established the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
(KACARE) in 2010 as the hub of the Saudi nuclear program – Riyadh 
expressed its intention to spend more than USD 100 billion on the 
construction of 16 nuclear reactors by 2030 and already signed agreements 
with Argentina, China, France and South Korea. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
placed considerable emphasis on the indigenous development of relevant 
industrial and human capital. In late 2013, for example, France’s EDF and 
AREVA signed agreements with several organizations and universities in the 
country specifically to “develop its future nuclear program by contributing to 
the development of a local network of manufacturers and by training qualified 
engineers”.20   
 
An initial application of our hedging indicators suggests that Saudi Arabia may 
well be taking steps down the nuclear path. From a technical perspective, 
Saudi Arabia emphasized that it will seek to match Iran’s residual capability 
after implementation of the JCPOA. Our research also suggests that since the 
agreement of the JCPOA, Riyadh appears to have taken steps to increase the 
pace of its nuclear development, evidenced by a reported flurry of 
communications around entities involved in the Saudi civil program requesting 
its pace be picked up.21 
 
From a narrative perspective, Riyadh has been persistent in its claims that it 
must develop a program to rival Iran’s if the regional balance of power is to be 
maintained. The narrative here is different from that of Iran but equally 
powerful: Tehran pushed the boundaries of its obligations under the NPT and 
Saudi Arabia is simply seeking to exploit the legitimacy that Iran’s nuclear 
program gained from the process. Finally, there are also diplomatic indicators 
of hedging. Riyadh’s advocacy of nuclear engagement on the part of the 
GCC, for example, could be viewed as a means of providing broader 
legitimacy to the Kingdom’s own nuclear advancement. 
 
On a larger scale, the prospect of Saudi Arabian nuclear hedging, even at a 
low level of latency, says much about how the region perceives the JCPOA. 
The JCPOA rolled back Iran’s nuclear program, but it also recognized and 
legitimized Iran’s proliferation behaviour. Above all else, it highlighted the 
potential for a state to use civil nuclear development as a cover for a 
proliferation strategy that brings it relatively close to the nuclear weapons 
threshold while remaining a member of the NPT; and, crucially, leaving open 
the possibility of full re-engagement with the international community without 
completely sacrificing its nuclear capacity. Granted, the path here is not pain-																																																								
20 “AREVA, EDF sign accords for Saudi nuclear program”, Saudi Gazette, 1 January 2014.	
21 Project interviews, April 2016. 
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free - sanctions crippled Iran’s economy - nor is it necessarily entirely 
planned; yet the process undoubtedly set a precedent. 
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Promoting Nuclear Restraint 
 
What, then, can be done to encourage and promote continued nuclear 
restraint in the Middle East? How can the international community assuage 
the doubts and concerns of Iran’s regional neighbors, in particular Saudi 
Arabia? 
 
Rigorous and transparent implementation of the JCPOA  
 
While the JCPOA leaves Iran with an enrichment capability and a low level of 
nuclear latency, the trade-off here came in the form of greater transparency 
and increased oversight regarding Iran’s nuclear activities over a prolonged 
period. As well as implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) to its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, the JCPOA 
provides for a set of monitoring conditions that go beyond what the CSA and 
AP normally require. The demanding nature of the agreement is reflected in 
the IAEA’s need to increase the resources devoted to work in this area. For 
example, to monitor and verify Iran’s adherence to its CSA and AP, as well as 
implementation of the JCPOA, the IAEA claims it increased the number of 
personnel working on the Iranian file by approximately 120 per cent. 22 
According to the most recent IAEA Board of Governors’ Report, Iran has thus 
far met its obligations under the JCPOA.23 Further progress in this vein will, 
over time, have a cumulative effect in terms of evidencing Iran’s claims that it 
is committed to addressing concerns regarding its nuclear objectives.  
 
Innovative confidence-building measures  
 
It is of central importance that regional actors are eventually engaged in 
dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue. Areas here could include nuclear 
safety and nuclear security, both issues with implications that reach beyond 
regional rivalries. It is no secret that Iran’s neighbors are wary of the safety of 
Iran’s Bushehr power plant, particularly because they would be first to feel the 
effects of a safety breach.24 Our research suggests that experts in the GCC 
countries are not opposed to dialogue with Iran on nuclear safety and 
security, although they are generally wary of any dialogue with Tehran. In 
individual interviews with Iranian officials, the authors heard that Tehran is not 
opposed to dialogue with the Arab Gulf states on this issue. Iran could build 																																																								
22 “Monitoring and Verification in Iran”, International Atomic Energy Agency, 5 May 2016, 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran. 
23 “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, Board of Governors’ Report, GOV/2016/8, IAEA, 
26 February 2016.	
24 Dina Esfandiary, “Two tremors in two weeks, and many questions for Iran”, The National, 
22 April 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/two-tremors-in-
two-weeks-and-many-questions-for-iran. 
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on the current dialogue that it has with the European Union on nuclear 
safety25 to include the Arab Gulf states as a confidence building measure.  
 
There may also be lessons to be drawn from history in this context. In the 
1980s, for example, there was considerable concern regarding the budding 
nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. At that time, “most surveys of 
nuclear proliferation put [these countries] on a short list of threshold 
nations”.26 Both nations “had avoided full-scope IAEA safeguards and had 
certain unsafeguarded nuclear facilities with military potential”.27  
 
By the mid-1990s, however, this situation had changed dramatically: 
Argentina and Brazil had renounced interest in nuclear weapons and 
implemented a range of non-proliferation measures. A key element of this 
turnaround was the bilateral agreement that established the Brazilian–
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) 
in 1991. The world’s first binational safeguards organization was tasked with 
verifying the peaceful use of materials that could be used for the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons. It represented an innovative approach to defusing the 
two countries’ nuclear rivalry: verification and transparency were used as a 
means of channeling mutual suspicion into a means of building confidence 
and trust. 
 
It may not be possible to replicate this Latin American experience in the 
Middle East, but with progress towards a WMD-free zone in the Middle East 
stalling, it is important to explore new options. A regional agency involving 
Iran and neighboring states in the Gulf, or the wider Middle East region, 
modelled along the lines of the ABACC, for example, could serve as an 




Another area relates to the potential role of security assurances in providing 
an insurance policy of sorts to the GCC states, either collectively or on an 
individual basis. Designed as “attempts by one state or set of states to 
convince another state or set of states” that they “will not allow the recipients’ 
security to be harmed”, positive security assurances would need to focus on 
convincing the GCC states that Iranian hedging can be contained. In the 
event that Iran seeks to expand its latent nuclear potential or even develop 																																																								
25 “EU-Iran cooperate on nuclear safety”, World Nuclear News, 22 April 2016, 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-EU-Iran-cooperate-on-nuclear-safety-2204168.html 
26 John R. Redickm Julio C. Carasales and Paulo S. Wrobel, “Nuclear rapprochement: 
Argentina, Brazil, and the nonproliferation regime”, Washington Quarterly (1995), Vol. 18, No. 
1, pp. 107-122. 
27 Ibid. 
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weapons, external states or groups of states will provide a bulwark against the 
perceived threat.28 In doing so, the aim would be to directly influence the 
strategic calculus of the GCC states and convince them not to pursue a 
counter-balancing nuclear capacity. 
 
Specific positive security assurances have already been issued by all five 
nuclear weapon state parties of the NPT to provide or support assistance to 
all Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) parties if they are “a victim of an act 
or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”.29 
But as part of acclimatizing to, and reassuring the GCC states about, the 
prospect of Iran retaining a hedging option under the JCPOA, the UN Security 
Council’s five permanent members (P5) should continue to consider how they 
can enhance these assurances at the regional level. The summit hosted at 
Camp David by President Obama in May 2015 was a step in the right 
direction but more needs to be done in this regard. For example, the P5 
should consider how they can collectively, or individually, engage with the 
GCC states to re-emphasize their commitment to providing assistance in the 
event they are subject to nuclear threats. Given that President Obama is now 
approaching the end of his second and final term in office, though, there is 
clearly very little that he can now do, particularly as the Arab Gulf states are 
disillusioned by how they perceive the current administration’s commitment to 
their security. 
 
Positive security assurances can also come in the form of security 
guarantees. Traditionally, the GCC states relied heavily on bilateral security 
arrangements with the USA and other Western powers, including France and 
the UK, to come to their aid in the event of external aggression. While Iranian 
hedging is not an overt form of aggression, the anxiety caused by the latent 
threat of nuclear acquisition could perhaps be dealt with through enhanced 
security guarantees. This appears to be an approach taken by the Obama 
administration in recent years. Secretary of State John Kerry was quick to 
hold discussions to reassure GCC counterparts after the Lausanne talks. 
Beyond diplomatic rhetoric, the recently established GCC–US Strategic 
Cooperation Forum provides a practical means of strengthening collective 
security through empowering Arab states in areas such as ballistic missile 
defense.30  
 																																																								
28 Jeffrey Knopf (ed), Security Assurances and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 3. 
29 See, for example, Resolution 255, “Question Relating to Measures to Safeguard Non-
Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
United Nations, 19 June 1968, http:// unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/255. 
30 Joint Communiqué Following the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the GCC- U.S. Strategic 
Cooperation Forum’, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 25 September 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2014/09/232169.htm.	
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From a GCC perspective, missile defense cooperation could potentially form 
the basis of a future deterrence-by-denial posture if Iran were to make a dash 
for the bomb. This is a less provocative option. It also allows the region to 
develop a deterrent posture without having to take risks related to the 
reliability, and therefore the credibility, of any nuclear promises that could 
potentially be offered by external powers. The prospect of a wider Western 
rapprochement with Tehran appears to have tested the faith of Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf states in the reliability of Western, and particularly American, 
security guarantees. This is partly reflected in the growing assertiveness of 
the Gulf States in Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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Looking Beyond the Nuclear Issue 
 
The non-proliferation implications of the Iranian nuclear challenge and the 
JCPOA are significant, not least because of the possibility of interpretative 
dualism described in the sections above. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that the nuclear issue continues to focus attention. Yet the research for this 
project suggests that the emphasis placed on the nuclear issue by Western 
powers is not reflected in the region and may be analytically limiting, as well 
as politically naive. Our research indicates that for many in the region, the 
nuclear issue is in fact secondary to broader concerns regarding what is 
perceived as Iran’s expansionist regional policy under an opaque, convoluted 
Islamic government, and this is not new. More specifically, the dominant 
concern regarding the JCPOA is the extent to which the deal and the budding 
rapprochement with Western powers facilitate Tehran’s subversive 
maneuvering in the Middle East. 
 
Iranian expansionism: Nothing new 
 
The Arab Gulf states opposed the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 
P5+1 for a number of reasons, including not being included in the talks 
themselves, the likelihood that the talks would lead to some form of 
rapprochement between Iran and the US and the potential impact they would 
have on Iranian policy in the region. But in their eyes, the nuclear negotiations 
and the final agreement have only worsened an already existing problem in 
the region: Iran’s regional expansionism. The Arab Gulf governments (with 
Oman as the exception) view the Islamic Republic as a state that seeks to 
expand itself, its influence and its ideology in the region. They fear Tehran 
wants to be the leader of the Muslim world, something Iranian rhetoric 
consistently emphasizes. In addition, Iran’s focus on dialogue with the P5+1 
rather than the region gives the impression of Iranian exceptionalism and that 
Tehran views itself as a regional leader that can only talk to major world 
powers, not the region. Iran “doesn’t consider the Arab countries as equals, 
but rather as followers” said a GCC official we interviewed.31  
 
This Arab Gulf sentiment is not new. Interviewees indicated that it was in fact 
the Arab Spring that crystalized this impression of Iran. Tehran’s advocacy in 
favor of a regional Islamic awakening after the uprising in Tunisia both 
frightened the leadership in the Arab Gulf states and made Tehran look 
insincere when it intervened on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al Assad 
during the Syrian uprising. “Iran became enemy number one, ahead even of 
Israel” in the minds of the Arab Gulf states.32 The Arab Spring also firmly 																																																								
31 Project interviews, May 2016.  
32 Project interviews, May 2016.	
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established the Islamic Republic as an “ideological problem” and a “religious 
country not a political country”, that believes it “takes orders from Allah to 
wage war in the region” in the minds of the Arab Gulf states.33 According to 
them, Iran’s links to Shia groups in the region and resulting meddling in Arab 
affairs, legitimizes Saudi leadership of the Sunnis and their collective efforts to 
check Iran. For those who still believed that it was best to establish dialogue 
with Iran rather than check it militarily and through proxies, the opacity and 
fluidity of the political scene in Tehran have made it difficult to find 
interlocutors. “Who can we talk to?” asked a number of interviewees in the 
Arab Gulf countries.34 While some recognized that the Rouhani administration 
may be willing to engage, they expressed doubts over whether the President 
and his team could actually fulfil any promises made during talks.  
 
Crucially, while views of Iran were turning sour, the feeling that the west was 
abandoning the region also grew following the changes brought on by the 
Arab Spring. Our research highlighted that along with Iranian expansionism, 
US retrenchment from the region was a major concern. Policy elites and 
experts throughout the Arab Gulf states view the US under Obama as over-
stretched and unwilling to commit to the region. This is why, according to 
them, Obama refused to intervene in Syria.35 As a result, even before the 
nuclear agreement, the region faced what they deemed to be a growing threat 
from an increasingly expansionist Iran and a perceived shrinking of US 
resolve and presence to help them face this threat.  
 
Fears after the JCPOA 
 
The fears that the July 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran would worsen 
already tense relations in the region seem to have materialized. As 
mentioned, while the leadership of the Arab Gulf states were already fearful of 
the perceived growing expansionism of Iran, they believed that the nuclear 
negotiations and the final agreement would belittle their concerns and instead, 
provide Iran further means to fund its proxies and destabilize the region at 
their expense. In their eyes, the deal was evidence that the US will no longer 
defend their interests in the face of the growing Iranian threat, but rather that it 
planned to abandon them in favor of a turn towards Iran. US coordination with 
Iran in Iraq was cited as evidence of this. The Arab Gulf states view any 
rapprochement with Iran as tantamount to accepting Iranian gains in the 
region. The leadership of the Arab Gulf countries clearly view the nuclear deal 
with Iran as a zero-sum, “Iran has won” outcome. As a result, while the deal 
																																																								
33 Project interviews, May 2016. 
34 Project interviews, May 2016. 
35 Project interviews, May 2016.	
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has not led to new developments and perceptions, it has worsened already 
existing ones, and led to a deterioration of regional relations in its aftermath.  
 
With the nuclear agreement, the need to counter Iran has clearly become 
further entrenched in the minds of the Arab Gulf leadership.36 The doubling-
down of the region will inevitably inflame sectarian conflicts in the region for 
the foreseeable future. With its recent, more assertive foreign policy, Riyadh 
intends to counter perceived Iranian influence either through check-book 
diplomacy, which it has employed in the past, or more overtly, which Riyadh 
seems to prefer today, as in Yemen. The ongoing, year-long conflict in Yemen 
seems to be the result of perceived Iranian control of the Houthi rebels and a 
resultant unified, Arab Gulf effort to check Iranian advances, without the help 
of the west:37 The GCC “can’t put their eggs in the US basket anymore, so 
they’re taking initiative” said one interviewee.38 This intervention is both a 
message to the US - that the Arab Gulf states can guarantee their own 
security without it - and a message to Iran - that this is a new era where the 
Arab Gulf states will no longer sit by and wait for help, but rather, not hesitate 






36 Project interviews, May 2016. 
37 See Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, “Yemen: the lowest hanging fruit for dialogue 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia?”, Washington Quarterly (forthcoming, 2016) 




The principal project output was an expert workshop organized around the 
theme of regional security in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal. The workshop 
was held in Dubai, UAE in April 2016 and included some 15 academics, 
policy-makers and analysts from the region. To encourage frank discussion, 
the workshop was a closed event held under the Chatham House Rule and 
focused on the slightly more general topic of regional security after the Iran 
Deal. This was essential because it would not have been possible to gather 
regional experts if the topic was limited to regional proliferation responses to 
the Iran deal. The workshop identified and developed key issues of relevance 
to the research. Crucially, the event provided the research team with a 
comprehensive insight into regional thinking on the impact Iranian nuclear 
deal, as well as how this issue fits within the broader security landscape in the 
Middle East. The workshop built on discussions with experts in Washington, 
London, Vienna, Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar.  
 
Beyond this workshop, the research has informed a number of academic 
publications, comment pieces and high-level policy briefings. These are listed 
below: 
 
• In July 2015, Dr Moran and Prof Bowen published an article in the 
renowned, peer-reviewed journal International Affairs. This article drew 
on the literature review and set out preliminary analysis and research 
themes. 
  
• In July 2015, Ms Esfandiary conducted briefings at the National 
Assembly in Paris and the European External Action Service in 
Brussels that drew on the work conducted for this project. 
 
• In October 2015, Prof Bowen presented project research at an 
Economic and Social Research Council funded workshop at University 
of Bristol. 
 
• In November 2015, Ms Esfandiary was asked to brief NATO officials at 
the annual NATO parliamentary assembly in Norway. 
 
• In November 2015, Ms Esfandiary presented on these issues at a 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-organized workshop in Amman, Jordan. 
 
• In December 2015, Dr Moran included project research in his briefing 
to Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States. 
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• In January 2016, Ms Esfandiary presented research findings in a Wall 
Street Journal briefing in London. 
 
• In March 2016, Dr Moran presented research findings to high-ranking 
officers at the Irish Senior Command and Staff College. 
 
• In March 2016, Prof Bowen and Dr Moran presented on project 
research to members of the UK House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee 
 
• In May 2016, Ms Esfandiary drew on the research conducted as part of 
this project to contribute to a report on Iran for the European 
Parliament. 
 
• In May 2016, Prof Bowen gave a talk at Georgetown Qatar in Doha on 
nuclear non-proliferation, which drew on some of the project’s research 
findings. 
 
• On 1 June 2016, Ms Esfandiary gave a briefing to the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service that drew on some of the research 
findings. 
 
• In June 2016, Prof Bowen, Dr Moran and Ms Esfandiary will publish a 
book, Living on the Edge: Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging, 
with Palgrave Macmillan. The research for this book predates the 
current project, yet its conclusions were directly influenced by project 
research. 
 
• In July 2016, Ms Esfandiary will publish a co-authored piece on 
Yemen, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Washington Quarterly that drew 
on the research conducted for this project. 
 
• Dr Moran, Prof Bowen and Ms Esfandiary are currently finalizing an 






The research for this project provided us with a unique insight into Arab Gulf 
perceptions of the Iranian nuclear issue and its resolution. The assumption 
that the Iranian nuclear challenge was a dominant security concern for 
regional actors was discredited. Our research indicates that the nuclear issue 
is in fact secondary to broader regional concerns regarding Iran’s perceived 
expansionist regional policy. These concerns were not new; in the eyes of the 
Arab Gulf leadership, the 2011 Arab Uprisings highlighted the Islamic 
Republic’s double standards when it called for a region-wide Islamic 
Awakening but intervened to protect President Assad in Syria. Along with 
Iranian expansionism, the region anxiously watched what they saw as gradual 
US disengagement from the Middle East.  
 
Today, the Arab Gulf states consider the JCPOA an important development, 
but view it in zero-sum terms as a victory for Iran. While efforts to develop 
civilian nuclear programs in the region began before the deal itself, they were 
somewhat focused on mirroring what Iran had. To the Arab Gulf states, the 
agreement legitimized Tehran’s past proliferation behavior and allows it to 
retain an enrichment capacity. As a result, Riyadh repeated that it wants to 
indigenously develop a similar hedging capability, but to date, little concrete 
progress has been made.  
 
The dominant concern in the region, however, is the extent to which the 
JCPOA provides Iran with further means to fund its proxies and destabilize 
the region at their expense and the perceived rapprochement with the West 
legitimizes Tehran’s regional gains. Today, the leadership in the Arab Gulf 
states feels abandoned by the US and determined to check Iran through its 
own means.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
